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Abstract
We study the drivers of the life-cycle gender wage gap. In our equilibrium search
model, firms set the unit price of human capital of men and women, value stable matches
with high productivity gains and can statistically discriminate across genders based on
differences in turnover and human capital processes. This endogenous wage setting is
crucial for evaluating policies targeting the gap. We estimate the model on the first
15 years of workers’ careers in the NLSY79 data, and find that differences in workers’
and firms’ productivities explain 27% and 28% of the life-cycle gap respectively, while
statistical discrimination explains 45%.
JEL-codes: J16, J24, J31, J64.
1 Introduction
There is a substantial wage gap between men and women and, notably, it expands over
the life-cycle. There is an extensive literature that highlights gender differences in various
dimensions of labor market behavior, and how they may hinder women’s career progression.
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However, how do employers respond to these differences across genders? This paper studies
the drivers of life-cycle wage divergence across genders, incorporating firms’ decisions into
the analysis.
Using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), we document that
women are subject to more career interruptions due to childbirth and childcare, suggest-
ing that they might accumulate less human capital than men over time. In particular, we
find that women college graduates in the NLSY79 spend 16 months in fertility-related non-
employment, while men spend only 0.5 months on average. Moreover, we find that women’s
labor market turnover is also different from men’s outside of parental leave. For example,
women are 58.5% more likely to exit employment than men, which could also reflect family
concerns or childcare responsibilities. In order to quantify the response to these differences
from the demand side of the labor market, we build a model in which firms make wage
offer decisions based on average group characteristics. In other words, firms expect individ-
ual workers to follow the gender-specific patterns, and statistically discriminate workers by
gender.
In order to decompose the life-cycle wage gap into labor supply and demand factors in
a tractable way, we develop a dynamic search model of the labor market in which human
capital is a homogenous good. Workers accumulate on the stock of human capital while
employed, and firms set the price of the good to maximize expected profit. Men and women
differ in several dimensions, such as turnover rates, parental leave lengths and human capital
growth rates. In addition, some jobs can be available to both genders, while there might
also be jobs that employ only men or only women. In a labor market with frictions, workers
cannot be replaced immediately, and turnover is costly for firms. Employers take into account
the costs and values implied by the above gender differences, and price the human capital
of men and women accordingly. Such differential price-setting rules across gender will be
referred to as statistical discrimination for the rest of the paper.
The structure of the model allows us to decompose the gender wage gap into three additive
parts: the gap in accumulated human capital, the gap due to differences in the productivities
of firms employing men and women, and the gap in wage-rates offered to men and women
by equally productive firms. We find that over the first 15 years of a career, on average
27% of the gap is due to differences in human capital stocks, 28% is due to differences in
the productivities of firms’ that men and women match with, and 45% of the gap can be
attributed to statistical discrimination. The importance of these three channels varies at
different points of the life-cycle. The gap in human capital differences is cumulative and
more than doubles from the start of workers’ careers to 15 years later. This divergence of
human capital paths explains 73% of the total wage gap expansion. Statistical discrimination
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also becomes more important later on in the life-cycle when workers reach higher rungs of
the wage ladder, and explains 27% of the gap expansion. In contrast, the gap due to jobs
segregation stays relatively constant over the 15 years.
We quantify the relative importance of labor market transitions, human capital accumu-
lation rates, and parental leave durations and coverages on the gender wage gap, and find
that labor market transitions have the largest effect in narrowing the gap. In particular,
eliminating the differences in the separation rate reduces the gap by 57% on average. It
not only allows women to gain human capital and receive higher wages in the long run, but
also reduces firms’ statistical discrimination throughout the life-cycle. The magnitude of the
gap reduction would be underestimated by 80% if firms’ responses are ignored, especially
for younger women. Interestingly, when the human capital accumulation rate of women is
increased to the level of men (a 20% increase), the gap increases by 14.1% in earlier years
and decreases by 15.7% in later years. This is because women are willing to accept lower
wages with a better accumulation technology, and their equilibrium wage rates go down.
However, the gain in the human capital stock in the long run more than compensates for
the loss in wage rates, so the net effect on women’s wages is positive in late career.1 On the
other hand, parental leave generosity plays a relatively small role, and explain only 9.5% of
the gender wage gap.
Finally, we successively eliminate structural differences between genders to analyze the
complementarities between the different channels contributing to the gap. We find that an
increase in human capital accumulation rate amplifies the effect of an increase in job stability.
This is because when human capital accumulates faster, any increase in work experience due
to more stable employment implies a larger increase in the human capital stock. At the same
time, firms value match stability more when employees’ productivity grows faster, and they
respond with a better distribution of offers. Thus, equalizing transition rates together with
the human capital accumulation technology, leads to a combined effect on the gap that is
11% larger than the sum of their separate effects. In contrast, since equalizing parental leave
generosity does not lead to a substantial increase in the accumulation of actual experience nor
in the expected match durations, the complementarity of this channel with human capital
growth is quantitatively weaker.
1.1 Related Literature
For the most part, recent literature has focused on empirically quantifying the relative roles
of human capital accumulation and mobility differences between male and female workers.
1 We describe the effects of changes in all parameters in Section 5.
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Manning and Swaffield (2008), Del Bono and Vuri (2011), Goldin, Kerr, Olivetti, Barth
et al. (2017) and Barth, Kerr, and Olivetti (2017) find that differences in the returns to job
mobility and returns to experience account for most of the gender earnings gap 15 years
after leaving school. We formalize these two channels in a theoretical framework and take
a first step in endogenizing firms’ equilibrium wage offer distributions for men and women.2
Furthermore, by explicitly modeling women’s career interruptions when having children, we
also contribute to the literature about women’s career costs of having children.
Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2016) and Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) develop
dynamic models of human capital accumulation, fertility and labor supply choices of women
to estimate the impact of children on the gender wage gap. Importantly, these papers model
the workers’ choices given an exogenous distribution of wage offers. In contrast, we allow
firms to consider different labor market behaviors of men and women, which lead employers
to offer different wage rate menus to male and female workers in equilibrium. In an analysis
closely related to this paper, Bartolucci (2013) builds a search model with rent-splitting
and asks how much of the gender wage gap can be explained by differences in productivity,
frictions, segregation and wage discrimination. Our work differs from Bartolucci (2013) in
that we focus on the life-cycle, we introduce human capital dynamics and explicitly include
fertility and job protection in the model. Importantly, the analysis of discrimination is
different in Bartolucci (2013), who interprets it as differences in the rent-splitting parameter,
whereas in our framework discrimination is statistical and is reflected in the different wage
ladders set by the firms in equilibrium.
In concurrent work, both Bagger, Lesner, and Vejlin (2019) and Moser and Morchio
(2019) undertake a structural exercise linking the gender gap to the role of firms in the labor
market. Moser and Morchio (2019) use matched employer-employee data in Brazil to decom-
pose the gender gap into gender differences in job-to-job mobility versus firm heterogeneity
in amenities and employers’ gender preferences. There are several crucial differences between
our studies. First, we focus on the evolution of the gender wage gap over the life-cycle and
incorporate human capital accumulation. Second, we explicitly model fertility-related career
interruptions in order to quantify the “motherhood penalty” highlighted in the literature.
Third, we embed taste-based discrimination—if there is any—in the gender differences in
labor market behaviors in our framework, whereas Moser and Morchio (2019) allow firms
to have a taste parameter for men relative to women and it accounts for most of the gap
in Brazil (90%). Moser and Morchio (2019) find that mobility differences between men and
women accounts for about 25% of the gap, whereas in our framework job-to-job mobility
2 To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that considers the firms’ channel in equilibrium is Bowlus
(1997), which analyzes the static cross-sectional gender wage gap.
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patterns between men and women are very similar and do not contribute to the gap, while
the differences in separation rates account for a substantial share of it. These discrepancies
have to do with the stark differences between the Brazilian and the U.S. labor markets. In
particular, while men’s separation rate is higher than women’s in Brazil, it is the opposite
in the U.S. for all education groups.
Finally, although our framework’s wage determination differs from that of Bagger et al.
(2019), their work is closely related to ours. Bagger et al. (2019) develop a search model
with bilateral bargaining in which bilateral bargaining is exogenously fixed. Our paper
uses a wage-posting framework, and departs from Bagger et al. (2019) in a few dimensions.
First, we allow for the productivity distribution of firms to be gender specific, in line with
the evidence in recent empirical literature that finds women to be more likely to work in
lower-paying establishments than men (Albrecht et al. (2018), Goldin et al. (2017), Card,
Cardoso, and Kline (2016)). Second, the focus of our paper is on the quantification of the
endogenous responses of firms to gender differences in labor market behavior. Interestingly,
both Bagger, Lesner, and Vejlin (2019) and our paper find a relatively small contribution
of fertility-related career interruptions to the gap, even though Denmark and the U.S. have
different family leave policies.3 However, in contrast with Bagger, Lesner, and Vejlin (2019)
who find that differences in worker productivity and in the returns to labor market experience
drive most of the gap, we find a relatively weaker role of the human capital differences once
market segregation and optimal wage-setting by the firms are taken into account.
Finally, Xiao (2019) explores the demand side of the gender wage gap when firms statis-
tically discriminate and men and women differ in their preferences for amenities, fertility-
related career interruptions and separation rates. Unlike our work, Xiao (2019) focuses
on the differential sorting patterns of men and women across jobs of different productivity
levels over the lifecycle, in particular, on the under-representation of women in the high-
productivity positions. Interestingly, using linked employer-employee data for Finland, Xiao
(2019) also finds that higher separation rates of women account for a substantial share of
the life-cycle gap, especially when firms’ responses to this relative employment instability
are taken into account.
In the next section, we describe the data we use and provide evidence on differential wage
growth between men and women. In Section 3, we describe the model. Section 4 describes
the estimation strategy, Section 5 outlines our results and Section 6 concludes.
3 Though in our estimates the channel is quantitatively more substantial than in Bagger, Lesner, and
Vejlin (2019).
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2 Data
We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79); an annual longitudinal
dataset following the lives of 12,686 respondents who were between the ages of 14 to 22 in
1979.
For each week in the sample period, we know the employment status of a person, her
occupation and industry, her wages, and how many hours she worked in each week. We
can observe the transitions workers make across different jobs each worker had, however,
we can only identify employers within each worker’s employment history. Using this infor-
mation we are able to reconstruct the (weekly) labour market histories of individuals since
leaving full-time education, including the individua’s transitions between employment and
non-employment; transitions between jobs; actual and potential work experience; wages and
hours worked, and birth of each child (if any).
We restrict our sample to non-black, non-Hispanic individuals in the first 15 years in
the labor market and in order to have labor markets with comparable workers, we stratify
the labor force by education level using the information on highest grade completed. We
restrict our attention to individuals with 12 to 15 years of schooling—we refer to this as
the group of “high school graduates”,—and the group of those who have 16 to 20 years of
schooling—which we refer to as the group of “college graduates”.
Finally, in order to evaluate the impact of having children on life-cycle wages, we focus
on people who had their first child after leaving school. These restrictions leave us 1,376
men and 1,331 women in the high-school graduates’ group, and 653 men and 681 women in
the group of college graduates.4
In terms of fertility, we know the date of birth of the child born to a respondent. Using
this information we are able to reconstruct the detailed weekly labour market histories of
individuals from 1979 to 2012. The main limitation we face with these data is that we do
not directly observe parental leave take-up or job protection in the data. Thus, we infer
fertility-related career interruptions from the worker’s employment history by looking at
each worker’s employment status around the birth of her child. We assume that a worker is
in a fertility-related career interruption if we observe the parent being non-employed5 in any
of the first 20 weeks of the child’s life. Fertility-related interruptions last until the worker
4 We trim the top and the bottom (which include many zeros) 3% of the wage distributions, which tend
to be thin and cover wide ranges. The reason for this is that the model has a difficult time reconciling these
observations that result in sometimes implausible firm productivity values. The choice of a trim level does,
of course, have a direct effect on the estimates, but sensitivity analysis done with no trimming and a 3%
trim level reveals that the parameters and conclusions of interest are robust.
5 We treat the states of unemployment and out-of-the-labor force as the same non-employment state
(excluding fertility-related career interruptions, as described immediately).
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is observed working for at least 4 consecutive weeks. If a worker was not working in the
weeks preceding childbirth, these weeks are counted as fertility-related interruption up to 3
months before the date of birth. Not working before that counts as regular non-employment.
We infer the leave being protected by the employer if the first employer she has after the
maternity spell is the same as the last employer before that.
In the U.S., federally mandated maternity leave was only introduced by the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993, which provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected
leave to workers in companies with 50 employees or more. Prior to FMLA 1993, maternity
leave coverage was governed by state laws, collective bargaining agreements and the goodwill
of employers.6 The data in Waldfogel (1999) show that no more than 40% of employees in
medium to large firms7 (and no more than 20% in small firms8)were eligible to any form of
maternity leave prior to 1993.
Out of those individuals who have children in our NLSY79 sample, 60% of them had their
first child before 1988 and 86% before 1993. Given that the average number of children one
has is close to 1 in our sample, we do not exploit the introduction of FMLA to analyze the
effect of job protected maternity leave policies on employment with our sample. However,
of those women who were working prior to childbirth, about 65.7% of them took maternity
leave, and about 61.4% of those who were on leave went back to work within a year, mostly
to the same employers. Therefore, we incorporate job protected maternity leave into our
framework.
In the model, workers are subject to a fertility shock that takes them into maternity leave.
If the worker is employed, upon the maternity shock, she separates from her current job to
take maternity leave, and her employer decides whether to provide her with job protection
as we explain in Section 3.1.
To compute the turnover rates— job-finding, separation, and job-to-job moves,— we
only use the transition events outside of fertility-related career interruptions . We do this
so that the gender differences in the turnover are not, at least directly, related to fertility
events, which we treat separately in the model.
6 Only six states (California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington)
required at least some private sector employers to offer maternity leave coverage prior to 1988. See more
details about US maternity leave policies in Berger and Waldfogel (2004).
7 These are firms with more than 100 employees.
8 These are firms with less than 100 employees.
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Figure 1: Gender Wage Gap over the Life-Cycle
Notes: The lines in the figures above represent the coefficients of male dummy in a series of
regressions that include, sequentially: potential experience fixed effects, a quadratic in actual
experience and 3-digit occupations. All the regressions control for year fixed effects.
2.1 Gender Wage Differences
This section provides descriptive evidence on the widening gap in earned wages between men
and women, and gender differences in labor market turnover by education groups.
Substantial male and female wage differentials exist even at the beginning of workers’
careers. The initial gap in log-wages is 0.18 for high-school graduates and 0.07 for college
graduates in our sample. Fifteen years into a career, the gaps are 0.28 and 0.32, respectively,
for the two education groups. The gap for more educated workers is smaller initially but its
expansion is more pronounced than for the workers without a college degree. Controlling
for occupation and hours worked has only a moderate impact on the size of the gap and
its dynamics, as Figure 1 shows. Part of these widening wage gaps in Figure 1 might be
attributed to different labor market behaviors of men and women. Table 1 presents some of
these gender differences in the first 15 years of their working lives. Women tend to accumulate
much less actual experience (a point highlighted by Erosa et al. (2016)). One of the reasons
for this difference might be related to fertility—career interruptions around childbirth are
very long for women relative to men, both when they return to their old job after childbirth
and when they start working for a new employer.
The lower panel of Table 1 illustrates the differences in turnover rates across genders. For
the less educated group, there are pronounced differences in the job-finding and job-to-job
transition rates (women’s rates are lower than men’s by 24% and 19%, respectively). For
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Gender and Education
HS Graduate College Graduate +
Men Women Men Women
Sample Size 1, 376 1, 331 653 681
Actual experience (years) 11.6891 10.1749 12.8230 11.7318
(0.0984) (0.1116) (0.1302) (0.1399)
Number of children 1.1940 1.4891 1.2757 1.3715
(0.0306) (0.0322) (0.0485) (0.0465)
Same job after ML 0.897 0.6943 0.9541 0.8058
Time spent in ML (months)
Same job after ML 0.3151 1.9686 0.1449 1.8423
(0.0337) (0.1026) (0.0081) (0.2236)
Different job after ML 4.4867 16.9850 3.6523 14.8117
(0.4876) (1.0669) (0.7253) (2.0007)
Transition rates outside ML
Job-finding rate 0.2217 0.1681 0.2198 0.1977
Separation rate 0.0340 0.0367 0.0155 0.0245
Job-to-Job transitions 0.0201 0.0162 0.0156 0.0168
Note: This table reports the differences in turnover rates across genders by time that workers have been
in the labor market for 15 years according to the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).
the more educated group, the job-finding rate of women is lower than men’s by 10%, and
the separation rate of women is higher than that of men by striking 58%.
3 Model
Time is continuous and we focus on the steady-state analysis. Male and female workers are
each composed by two (exogenously determined) education groups representing high school
graduates and college graduates. Each gender-education group is a separate labor market, so
that preferences, human capital accumulation technology, and search frictions are assumed
to be gender and education specific. In what follows, we describe one such gender-education
labor market. All gender g ∈ {m, f} and skill superscripts s ∈ {Highschool, College} are
omitted to keep the notation as simple as possible.
There is a continuum of firms and workers. Workers are risk-neutral, they discount the
future at rate r and maximize expected discounted lifetime income. They exit the labor
market permanently at rate φ > 0, and a new inflow of workers joins the labor market at the
same rate—yielding an overlapping generations structure where workers ages are distributed
according to the exponential distribution.
Each worker enters the market with individual initial ability, ε—which represents human
capital or productivity at the beginning of her career,—and is drawn from an exogenous
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distribution A(ε) with support [ε, ε]. Human capital is general and one-dimensional. While
employed, the workers’ human capital grows at rate ρ and—following Burdett et al. (2016),—
we interpret this increase as learning-by-doing. While unemployed, productivity stagnates.
Hence, a type ε worker with actual experience x has productivity y = εeρgsx.
Firms are risk-neutral and operate according to a constant returns to scale technology.
They are heterogeneous in their technology parameter, p, drawn from the exogenous (and
continuous) cumulative distribution function (CDF hereafter) Γ(p) with support
[
p, p
]
. 9 At
each instant, every firm posts a wage offer consisting of a single wage rate z to all potential
applicants, employed and unemployed. If a worker with productivity y accepts this offer,
she matches with the firm, she gets paid a wage w = zy, reflecting the initial ability of the
worker, her actual experience which increases her productivity at rate ρ, and the wage rate
z that the firm posts to maximize its steady-state flow profits. The flow productivity of the
match (y, p) is yp, so that the flow profit from the match (y, p) is (p− z)y. Thus, each firm p
chooses an offer z to maximize its aggregated expected steady state flow profits pi(p, z) from
all the matches that will be formed at that instant.10
Let F (z) denote the fraction of the firms that offer wage rates no greater than z. The
offers’ distribution is determined in equilibrium through firms’ optimal choice of z.11
An employment relationship between a worker and a firm may end for a number of
reasons: first, a worker might be poached by some firm offering a higher wage rate z′;
second, workers face the risk of separation into unemployment at exogenous rate δ > 0.
Workers can receive job offers both in unemployment and while employed according to a
Poisson process and we allow the (exogenously given) arrival rates in each of these states
to be different: λu while unemployed and λe while employed. Third, workers are subject to
fertility shock, upon which the worker goes out of the labor force into the maternity leave
state (or ML).
Transitions into and out of ML are as follows. Workers may conceive a child in either
employment or unemployment according to a Poisson process with rate γ1. If the worker
was employed when she has a child, she separates from her current job to take maternity
leave, and her employer decides whether to provide her with job protection. We model this
decision in a reduced-form and parsimonious way by assuming that there is a chance η that
9 The assumption of constant returns to scale means that workers do not compete for the jobs—a firm
is ready to hire anyone who finds the offer attractive enough; therefore, we allow for the case when one
and the same firm employs both men and women, educated and not—if this firm is in the support of the
firms distribution in several sub-markets. However, the wage rate is formulated by a firm separately for each
sub-market.
10 Informational frictions give monopsony power to firms, that choose to pay less that the marginal
productivity. In particular, they pay w = zy where z is a fraction of p, say θ. I.e. w = θpy.
11 In equilibrium the distribution F has a bounded support and no mass points.
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a job will be kept for a worker while she is on leave, and a chance 1 − η that she will lose
her job and will have to start searching again when she comes back to the labor market
from maternity leave. If she receives job protection, she enters maternity leave with job
protection and we call this state JP In this case, they stay in state JP until their spell at
home with the baby ends, and this spell ends according to another Poisson process, with
rate γ2. With the complementary probability if the worker is employed and with probability
1 if the worker is in unemployed, the worker does not get job protection and enters the state
NJP, which is an unprotected maternity leave state and does not allow her to go back to her
previous employment when the spell at home with the baby ends. The spell ends following
a different Poisson process γ3. If while in the state JP she gets a second child, she losses the
job protection provision and goes into the state NJP. So at each point in time, the worker,
characterized upon joining the labor force by an individual initial ability ε ∼ A(ε) is either
employed, unemployed, in JP or NJP for as long she is in the labor market.
Note that the differences in initial ability distributions may reflect limitations that some
segments in the economy face in acquiring skills before joining the labor market, and not
just innate abilities. Note also, that the gender differences in labor mobility or human
capital accumulation parameters across genders may capture taste-based discrimination.
For example, higher separation rates, or lower human capital accumulation rates of women
could reflect, at least in part, taste-based discrimination of behalf of firms. As laid out
in Section 3.3, firms and workers will take these parameters—regardless of the underlying
mechanisms that characterize them—as given, when solving their optimization problems.
3.1 Workers’ Behavior
In this section, for a given offer distribution F—which will be determined in equilibrium,—we
characterize optimal workers’ behavior.
Consider first an unemployed worker with productivity y and let U(y) denote the max-
imum expected lifetime payoff of an unemployed worker with productivity y. Since there
is no learning-by-doing while unemployed (and no depreciation), we have the following flow
Bellman equation describing U(y)
(r + φ)U(y) = by + λu
∫
max {0, V (y, z′)− U(y)} dF (z′) + γ1
(
WNJP (y)− U(y)) . (1)
The flow payoff of the worker is by, which reflects her value of leisure or home production.
She gets a job offer (that is, sees the vacancy posted by a firm which consists of a wage rate
offer z′) at rate λu, and accepts it if the maximum expected lifetime payoff taking the job
is higher than her current value of unemployment U(y). At rate γ1, the worker will have a
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child and, since she is not eligible for job protection, she enters NJP, stops sampling from F
and enjoys WNJP (y), which denotes the value of staying at home with the baby with no job
protection.
Now consider a worker with productivity y who is working at a firm paying wage rate z
and let V (y, z) denote the maximum expected lifetime payoff she gets. The following flow
Bellman equation describes the value function of the worker
(r + φ)V (y, z) = zy + ρy
∂V (y, z)
∂y
+ λe
∫
max {0, V (y, z′)− V (y, z)} dF (z′)
+ γ1
(
ηW JP (y, z) + (1− η)WNJP (y)− V (y, z))+ δ(U(y)− V (y, z)). (2)
The worker enjoys a flow payoff that is her wage zy, and the value of employment grows
due to human capital accumulation. There is on-the-job search, so the worker receives job
offers at rate λe and moves to a new firm offering wage rate z′ if V (y, z) < V (y, z′). Since
firms are identical and human capital is both general and transferable across firms, V (y, z) is
increasing in z. Thus the employed move to any outside offer z′ that is greater to the current
wage rate. At rate γ1 she has a child and with probability η she enter the job-protected
maternity leave state JP. With the complementary probability, 1 − η, the firm does not
provide job-protection and she enters NJP.
Let us now consider a worker in JP with productivity y and who may come back to her
previous job paying wage rate z. Her value, W JP (y, z), is given by
(r + φ)W JP (y, z) = bouty + γ2
(
V (y, z)−W JP (y, z))+ γ1(WNJP (y)−W JP (y, z)). (3)
While on leave, the worker gets her flow utility bouty, which reflects her value of time with a
newborn child. The worker remains “out of labor force” until the spell at home with the baby
ends, at rate γ2, upon which she will resume her previous job. We interpret γ2 as related
to the average number of months of job protection provided by firms in the labor market.
If the worker has another child during the leave period, she loses job protection. Note that
the value W JP (y, z) in job-protected stage depends on z, the wage rate offered by the last
employer before childbirth.
Finally, let us consider a worker in unprotected maternity leave, with value WNJP (y)
given by
(r + φ)WNJP (y) = bouty + γ3
(
U(y)−WNJP (y)) . (4)
The worker remains in this state until the alleviation shock, with arrival rate γ3, allows her
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to return to the labor force and search for jobs. We interpret γ3 as the time when family
concerns are “alleviated”, which could be related to the health of the mother and the baby,
the prevalence of daycare and so on.
As we show in Appendix C.1, the value functions take the following separable form,
U (y) = αUy,
V (y, z) = αE(z)y,
W JP (y, z) = αJP (z)y,
WNJP (y) = αNJPy.
where αU and αNJP are scalars and αE(z), αJP (z) are some (yet unknown) functions of z.
To simplify notation, let us denote the total quit rate by q(z). Then,
q(z) = φ+ δ + γ1 + λeF (z), (5)
where F (z) denotes the survival function corresponding to F (z).
Proposition 1. For a fixed CDF of offers F (·) with bounded and non-negative support,
optimal job search implies that
(i) αE(z) is the solution to the differential equation
dαE(z)
dz
=
1
r + q(z)− ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
.12
(ii)
(
αNJP , αJP (zR), αU , zR
)
satisfy the following four equations,
αNJP =
bout + γ3α
U
r + φ+ γ3
,
αJP (z) =
bout + γ2α
E(z) + γ1α
NJP
r + φ+ γ1 + γ2
,[
ζ1(λu − λe)− ρλu + (r + φ)ζ2
]
αU = λuz
R − λeb+
[
ζ2 +
γ1(λu − λe)
r + φ+ γ3
]
bout,
12 The boundary condition is
αE(z) =
z + γ1b
out
r+φ+γ2
+
[
γ1γ2[γ1+γ3+(1−η)(r+φ+γ2)]
(r+φ+γ2)(r+φ+γ1+γ2)
+ δ
]
αU
r + φ+ γ1 + δ − ρ− ηγ1γ2r+φ+γ1+γ2
,
and given the boundary condition, the solution is unique.
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ζ1α
U = b+
γ1
r + φ+ γ3
bout + λu
∫ z
zR
F (z)
r + q(z)− ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
dz.
where ζ1 = r + φ + γ1 − γ1γ3r+φ+γ3 and ζ2 =
λuγ1η(γ3−γ2)
(r+φ+γ3)(r+φ+γ1+γ2)
. Using the above four
equations, the reservation wage zR is implicitly defined by
ζ1
(
zR − b)+ (r + φ)ζ2
λu
(bout − b) + ρ
(
b+
γ1
r + φ+ γ3
bout
)
=
[
ζ1(λu − λe)− ρλu + (r + φ)ζ2
] ∫ z
zR
F (z)
r+q(z)−ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
dz.
Given this characterization of optimal worker behavior, we now turn to optimal firm
behavior.
3.2 Steady State Flow Conditions
The population of workers in each gender-education group is of measure one and is divided
into four subsets. (i) The set of employed workers mE, (ii) the set of unemployed workers
mU , (iii) the set that is at home with the baby and has job protection mJP , and (iv) the set
that is at home with the baby who does not have job protection mNJP . These steady-state
measures have to satisfy the balance-flow conditions detailed in Appendix C.3.
Moreover, the measure of workers below a certain level of human capital x in unemploy-
ment, employment, JP and NJP states must also remain constant in steady-state equilib-
rium.
Let N(x) and H(x) denote the distributions of accumulated experience among unem-
ployed and employed workers respectively; NJP (x), NNJP (x) the distributions of experience
among workers with and without job protection respectively; H(x, z) the joint distribution
of experience and wage rates among employed workers; and HJP (x, z) the joint distribu-
tion of workers in maternity leave with job protection. Since fertility and job protection
are random events, every employed worker has the same probability of having a child and
receive job protection at any point in time, regardless of her wage rate. In other words,
HJP (x, z) = H(x, z).
Characterizations of the measures mU , mE, mJP , and mNJP and the distributions N(x),
NNJP (x), and H(x, z) are given in Appendix C.3.
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3.3 Firms’ Profits
Notice that offering a wage rate z < zR implies that the firm makes zero profit (the firm
attracts no workers). Thus, in any market equilibrium we must have that z ≥ zR, and this
lower bound on the wage rates being offered in equilibrium, implies a lower bound on the
productivity of firms that participate in the labor market which we derive below.
Since there is no discounting, steady state flow profits equal the hiring rate of the firm
multiplied by the expected profit of each hire (Burdett et al. (2011)). As mentioned above,
a firm with productivity p, posts a wage rate z that maximizes steady state flow profits.
When a match between a firm with productivity p ≥ p and a worker with human capital y
is formed, the flow revenue is py and the wage contract is a fixed piece rate θ of this flow
output, so that the wage of the worker is w = θpy and the flow profit of the firm from this
match is y(p− z), z = θp. Hence, the expected profits of the firm are given by
pi(z, p) = yinit(z)yacc(z)(p− z),
where `(z) = yinit(z)yacc(z) is the total expected human capital available to the firm over
the entire expected duration of a match. This expected human capital stock consists of
two parts—the first part is the average human capital of new hires that the firm expects to
attract, which we denote by yinit(z), and the second part is the expected accumulation of
human capital as long as the workers will stay with the firm, which we denote by yacc(z).
To characterize steady state flow profits pi(z, p) let us introduce four steady-state ob-
jects. Let mU and mE denote the measures of workers in employment and unemployment
respectively. Let N(x) denote the fraction of unemployed workers with experience no greater
than x, and H(x, z) the joint CDF describing the probability that an employed worker has
experience no greater than x and wage rate no greater than z.13
First, note that the pool of potential hires consists of both employed and unemployed
workers. yinit(z) is thus defined by14
yinit(z) = mUλu
∫ ε
ε
ε
(∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
dN(x′)
)
dA(ε) +mEλe
∫ ε
ε
ε
(∫ z
zR
∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
d2H(x′, z′)
)
dA(ε).
Since we do not limit the number of children per worker, the firm must take into account
that any worker joining its workforce might have children over the course of her job-spell,
each time potentially getting a protected leave. Since the Poisson process governing fertility
is memory-less, regardless of how many children a worker has had in the past, at each point
13 Expressions for these steady-state objects are derived in Appendix 3.2.
14 We provide details of the derivation in Appendix C.4.
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in time the firm expects the same fertility and the same gains to be collected from the match
due to human capital accumulation, yacc(z). We thus define this term recursively as
yacc(z) =
∫ ∞
τ=0
[
q(z)e−q(z)τ
∫ τ
0
eρxdx+ ηγ1e
−q(z)τeρτ
∫ ∞
τ1=0
γ2e
−(φ+γ1+γ2)τ1yacc(z)dτ1
]
dτ. (6)
Note that yacc(z) consists of two parts. The first part is the expected accumulation that
happens over the duration of the match before any separation takes place—this separation
can be due to retirement φ, exogenous destruction shocks δ, a transition to a better job
λeF (z) or a child shock γ1. The second part of yacc(z) is relevant only in the case where the
worker gets job protection when having a child and she returns to her previous employer after
maternity leave. The probability that she receives job protection upon a child shock after a
match length of τ is ηγ1e−q(z)τ . To ensure that she returns to the previous job, the event of
returning should occur before retirement or an additional fertility shock—this happens with
probability γ2e−(φ+γ)τ1 for any duration of maternity leave τ1. When the worker returns, the
expected events are exactly the same as at the beginning of the match because the Poisson
process is memory-less. Thus, the expected accumulated human capital gain will again be
yacc(z) (recall that the firm has zero discount rate).
Simplifying equation (6),15 the firm’s problem becomes,
max
z
(p− z) ε˜
q(z)− ρ− ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
(
mUλu
∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
dN(x′) +mEλe
∫ z
zR
∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
d2H(x′, z′)
)
. (7)
Let us denote the optimal wage rate offer function by ξ(p). We solve for the equilibrium
in Appendix C.4 and provide a closed form equation defining defining policy function.
3.4 Definition of Market Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a tuple
{
zR, mE, mU , mJP , mNJP , H(·), N(·), NJP (·), NNJP (·), H(·, ·),
HJP (·, ·), ξ(p)} for all ε ∈ [ε, ε] and all p ∈ [p, p] such that,
i) mE,mU ,mJP ,mNJP , H(·), N(·), NJP (·), NNJP (·), H(·, ·), HJP (·, ·) are consistent with
steady-state turnover.
ii) Workers’ behaviors are optimal and zR satisfies Proposition 1.
iii) For any p ∈ [p, p], the firm’s optimal offer z = ξ(p) maximizes expected profits and
satisfies (26), so that F (z) = F (ξ(p)) = Γ(p).
15 Details of the derivation of this equation can be found in Appendix C.4.
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4 Estimation Strategy
To bring the model to the data, for each gender, we parametrize the ability distribution
A(ε) ∼ Weibull(ε, ε, α1, α2) and the productivity distribution Γ(p) ∼ Weibull(p, p, κ1, κ2).
We consider the reference time period as a month, letting φ = 0.0033 16 and r = 0.0041.
There are thus 16 parameters to estimate for each gender: {p, p, κ1, κ2, ρ, ε, ε, α1,
α2, δ, γ1, γ2, γ3, λe, λu, b}. We derive closed form expressions that allow us to recover
δ, γ1, γ2, γ3, λe, λu directly from the turnover and fertility data.17 To estimate the remaining
parameters, {p, p, κ1, κ2, ρ, ε, ε, α1, α2, b}, we use GMM and target a set of moments
that speak to each of the parameters. The first set of moments we use are mean log-wage
changes in job-to-job transitions at each of the first 10 years of actual experience. This set of
moments is informative about the distribution of firms’ productivities Γ, since wage changes
upon job switches only depend on the wage ladder and not on the rate of human capital
accumulation ρ or the individual initial ability ε. The second set of moments are mean
log-wages in the same years, which help to pin down rho—the only source of wage growth
beyond job-to-job transitions. Note that both job-to-job wage growth and mean log-wages
contain information about the productivity at home, b, because it enters the reservation
wage rate of the workers and is therefore directly related to the location of the lower rungs
of the equilibrium wage ladder. The third set of moments consists of variance, skewness and
kurtosis of the wage distribution for the same years. These moments reflect the shape of the
wage distribution and are informative on both Γ and A. Finally, in the absence of firm-level
data, we are unable to distinguish between two additive components of average wages - the
average ability and the average wage offer. Therefore, we make an identifying assumption
that the average ability of both genders is the same.
To sum up, our target moments are the first four moments of log-wage distribution
(mean, variance skewness and kurtosis) together with the average job-to-job wage changes,
each of them by year of actual experience, which we vary from 1 to 10—adding up to 50
moments. Let f(X, θ) denote the difference between the model implied target moments and
their sample analogues, where N is the number of individuals in the sample.
The GMM estimator of the true {p, p, κ1, κ2, ρ, ε, ε, α1, α2, b} is then
θˆ = arg min
θ
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(Xi, θ)
)′
W
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(Xi, θ)
)
,
16 Corresponding to an average of 25 years of prime-age career
17 We provide details of the expressions that allow us to link data durations and probabilities to these
parameters in Appendix D.1.
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with W a symmetric, positive definite matrix. We adopt a two-stage efficient GMM proce-
dure, as described in Appendix D.2.
Table 2 reports the estimated parameters for college-educated women. Estimates for
college educated men are tabulated in Table 4 in Appendix E.2.
5 Model Fit and Parameter Estimates
We present our estimates for college-educated women in Table 2. Our estimates for college
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for College Educated women
Estimates from data Jointly estimated parameters
δ 0.0224 p 10.5413
(0.1433)
γ1 0.0075 p 56.5479
(1.3290)
γ2 0.5253 κ1 0.8024
(0.0396)
γ3 0.0355 κ2 30.7866
(2.0997)
λe 0.0344 ρ 0.0031
(0.0000)
λu 0.2012 ε 0.5898
(0.0441)
η 0.8248 ε 7.6516
(1.1036)
r 0.0041 α1 2.6236
(0.1117)
φ 0.0021 α2 4.1969
(0.4226)
b 4.9439
(0.3535)
Note: This table reports the point estimates for college-educated women.
educated men are tabulated in Table 4 in Appendix E.2.
The model fits the log-wage profiles by actual experience remarkably well and we get
the rest of the moments within the confidence bands. Summaries of the fit of the targeted
moments by the model are presented in Figure 8 in Appendix E.1 and for men in Figure 9
in Appendix E.2. It is worthwhile noting that the target moments are computed by actual
experience. Note that the transition rates determine how actual experience is being accu-
mulated, so the log-wage profile by potential experience in Figure 2 shows the fit of both the
jointly estimated parameters and the transition rates.
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Figure 2: Fit of the log-wage profile by years in the labor force
Note: The figures show the fit of the model-implied average log-wages by number of years in the
labor market for college-educated workers
5.1 Counterfactual policy exercises
In this section, we illustrate the mechanisms through which policies targeting the gap can
impact life-cycle careers. In particular, we simulate the model when we eliminate gender
differences in i) the probability to retain the job upon childbirth; ii) the arrival rate of offers
in unemployment and iii) in employment; iv) the separation rate; and v) the human capital
accumulation rate. For each of these changes, first, we highlight the differential impact on
two additive components of life-cycle log-wage profiles: the profile of human capital log-
levels and the profile of human capital log-prices—where the latter component reflects the
process of climbing up the ladder, or the distribution of wage offers, which is determined in
equilibrium. Second, for each of the changes, we simulate, on the one hand, a counterfactual
scenario in which we keep the distributions of offers unchanged—we call this the partial
effect of the policy and, on the other hand, a scenario where we allow for the distribution of
offers to adjust—we call this the full effect of the policy.
Two main conclusions arise from this analysis. First, the endogenous adjustment of
human capital prices is an important channel through which policies affect individual careers.
Second, ignoring these endogenous adjustment leads to misleading conclusions regarding the
impact of the policy, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
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5.1.1 Lower separation rate for women
In Figure 3, we reduce the separation rate, δ,18 of women by 36.8% to equalize it to the
men’s level.19 Such a change would reduce the number of interruptions and allow for more
accumulation of human capital. This effect is relatively small for an average woman as
reflected in Figure 3a because separation events were already quite rare before the change20
and a 36.8% lower separation rate does not starkly increase the average human capital
accumulated by a woman. For a firm, however, the value of matches with all its female
employees goes up, and the total effect on expected profits is substantial, the range of
offers shifts up. It shifts up by less on the lower end, because the lower reservation rate
of the workers pulls the lowest offers down—with more secure jobs, the relative value of
employment increases, and workers are ready to accept lower wages. Figure 3b depicts the
effect on the human capital price profile, which reflects a substantial increase in the top
offers, a more moderate increase in the lower range of offers— relevant for inexperienced
women—and a steeper curvature due to longer periods of uninterrupted on-the-job search
and faster ascent up the prices ladder.
In terms of the gender wage gap, Figure 3c shows that the partial effect highly underesti-
mates the full impact of the change. When the firms’ wage-setting responses are ignored, the
model predicts that the gap will decrease, but only for more experienced women, due mostly
to gains from uninterrupted on-the-job search (because as we have seen in Figure 3a the
human capital path is almost unaffected by the policy). However, when endogenous firms’
wage offers are allowed to adjust— i.e. when we consider the full effect of the policy,— there
is a drastic reduction of the gap of 12.5 log-points (or 41.77%) on average over the first 15
years of a career. Had we ignored these equilibrium responses, we would have missed over
80% of the policy impact, especially for women at the beginning of their careers.
5.1.2 Increased arrival rate of offers for unemployed women
Figure 4 shows the effect of increasing the job-finding rate in unemployment, λu, by 16.4%
to equalize it to the men’s rate.21 This change would shorten the unemployment spells of
women, increasing the average human capital they can accumulate at each level of potential
18 Though this separation rate considers only separations outside of the parental leave spell, it can
potentially reflect that family-related responsibilities that are mostly carried by women.
19 This hypothetical change could be achieved through a policy that helps women to cope with family
related responsibilities such as better childcare provisions or higher flexibility in hours of a job.
20 Recall that the probability that an employed college-educated woman is unemployed next month is
2.25% as shown in Table 1 in Section 2.
21 We could think of increasing the job-finding rate in unemployment through a policy that helps unem-
ployed women to search more efficiently.
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Figure 3: Lower separation rate
(a) Average human capital (b) Average human capital price (c) The gender wage gap
Note: The figure shows the effect of a 36.8% decrease in the separation rate, δ, to equalize it to
the men’s level. Panel (a) shows the effect on human capital profile, Panel (b) shows the effect on
the average wage rate profile; in Panel(c), the baseline gap in log-wages between men and women
is depicted with a solid blue line, the dotted red line shows the partial effect of a change in the
parameter whereas the dashed green line shows the total effect that includes equilibrium responses of
the firms.
experience. This effect on human capital levels is cumulative and thus more pronounced at
longer horizons as Figure 4a shows. However, the effect is numerically small since unemploy-
ment itself is a relatively sporadic event22 in the life of an average woman. For the firms, a
higher arrival rate of offers in unemployment means that a given offer attracts more workers
from unemployment (see equation (7) in Section 3), increasing the profit rate, which is passed
on to the workers in the form of higher wage offers. The relative value of unemployment
goes up—since unemployed search is more efficient,—and the reservation rate increases,
raising the wage offers at the lower end of the distribution by more than at the higher end
and providing an additional wage rate boost for inexperienced women. Given a better menu
of offers, the profile of earned human capital prices shifts up, as can be seen in Figure 4b.
As with the coverage policy in Section 5.1.4, the price effect is stronger than the effect
on the human capital levels. In Figure 4c we clearly see that if the optimal wage-setting
decisions of the firms are ignored, the predicted effect of the policy on the gap—the partial
effect—would be very small and only visible later in a career, whereas the full effect would
be a non-negligible reduction of the gap by 3.1 log-points (or 19.9%) in the first 5 years of
potential experience and by 3.4 log-points (which corresponds to 11.8% as the gap increases)
in years 11-15.
22 The probability that an employed college-educated woman is unemployed next month is 2.25% (see
Table 1 in Section 2).
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Figure 4: Higher offers arrival rate in unemployment
(a) Average human capital (b) Average human capital price (c) The gender wage gap
Note: The figure shows the effect of a 16.4% increase to equalize it to the men’s arrival rate of
offers in unemployment, λu. Panel (a) shows the effect on human capital profile, Panel (b) shows
the effect on the average wage rate profile; in Panel(c), the baseline gap in log-wages between men
and women is depicted with a solid blue line, the dotted red line shows the partial effect of a change in
the parameter whereas the dashed green line shows the total effect that includes equilibrium responses
of the firms.
We do a similar exercise to quantify the effects of equalizing the job finding rate in
employment, λe, to the level of men, which implies a decrease of 7.9%, in Appendix E.3.1.
Under this change, the gap increases by 0.7 log-points (or 7.2%) at the onset of workers’
careers and by 1.5 log-points (which corresponds to 5.2% as the gap increases) in years
11-15.
5.1.3 Higher human capital accumulation rate for women
In Figure 5 we consider a 19.6% increase in women’s human capital accumulation speed,
equalizing their technology to the men’s level. As a direct consequence, female workers
become more productive and their human capital paths become significantly steeper, as
reflected in Figure 5a. The impact on the human capital prices is not straightforward: the
equilibrium wage ladder for females actually shifts down. The reason being, on the one hand,
that more productive matches are more valuable, shifting the firms’ offers up. On the other
hand, that workers value employment more relative to unemployment because the lifetime
benefits of additional human capital, which is general and does not depreciate, are high. As
a result, workers are willing to accept lower reservation wage rates in order to access this
efficient learning-by-doing technology. In equilibrium, both these endogenous effects—firms
ready to pay higher wages and workers ready to accept much lower wages— interact and
the lowest offer goes down and the highest offer goes up, but just a little bit relative to
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the reduction at the lower end. Overall, the menu of human capital prices deteriorates for
women, resulting in the downward shift of the prices profile over a career, as in Figure 5b.
If we ignore the equilibrium responses of the firms, we get that the gender wage gap
reduces significantly, especially towards year 15 where the cumulative effect of actual expe-
rience is the highest—as reflected by the red dashed line in Figure 5c. However, the total
effect is more nuanced and incorporates the changes in the human capital prices set by the
firms. The green dashed line shows the total effect and we see that the gap actually expands
by 2.1 log-points (or 14.1%) for inexperienced women in years 1-5 of a career— they have
not yet reaped the benefits of higher human capital accumulation, but are already exposed
to a menu of lower human capital prices. For women later in a career, the gap shrinks by
0.045 (or 15.7%) on average in years 11-15, because the benefits of additional human capital
stock outweigh the costs of lower human capital prices. The partial effect fails to capture the
nuanced equilibrium responses outlined above and thus would mislead the policy analysis.
Figure 5: Higher human capital accumulation rate
(a) Average human capital (b) Average human capital price (c) The gender wage gap
Note: The figure shows the effect of a 19.6% increase in the human capital accumulation rate ρ to
equalize the parameter to the men’s level. Panel (a) shows the effect on human capital profile, Panel
(b) shows the effect on the average wage rate profile; in Panel(c), the baseline gap in log-wages
between men and women is depicted with a solid blue line, the dotted red line shows the partial
effect of a change in the parameter whereas the dashed green line shows the total effect that includes
equilibrium responses of the firms.
5.1.4 Increased protected maternity leave coverage
In Figure 6, we examine the effect of increasing the incidence of job-protected maternity
leave for women to the level of men (16.2% increase in η), meaning that more women can
come back to their old jobs after having a child and do not have to spend time searching for a
new position. Such a policy would have virtually no effect on the human capital profile of an
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average woman as Figure 6a shows; this is because the fertility events are rare.23 However,
for each firm, the higher incidence of women who continue their jobs after childbirth implies
that average match duration increases. Now, firms have a longer horizon over which to reap
the benefits of women’s growing human capital, increasing the value of the match. Part
of this increase is passed on to women in the form of higher wage offers. This means that
women now sample human capital prices from a better distribution, which is reflected in
the upward shift of the wage rate profile in Figure 6b. Note that the increase in the price
profile for younger women is less pronounced than for more experienced women. This is
due to a subtle equilibrium effect: the higher incidence of job protection makes employment
relatively more valuable than unemployment, bringing the reservation wage rate down. In
equilibrium, the lowest offer balances the willingness of the workers to accept lower wages
and the willingness of the firms to pay a higher rate. As a result, the wage offers at the
lower end of the distribution increase less than the offers at the higher end. This means
that younger women—who usually start from the lower rungs of the wage ladder—will
experience a weaker increase in the price they get for their human capital than women later
in a career.
Though not big quantitatively, the impact of the policy on human capital prices is
stronger than its impact on human capital levels. This point is further illustrated in Fig-
ure 6c, where we show that when the distribution of offers is fixed, the policy has virtually
no impact on the gender wage gap— i.e. the partial effect is very small. Only later in life,
one can see some gains from the additional time spent in employment. Once the response
of the firms is included, however, the effect is already felt at the beginning of a career, since
young women also enjoy a slightly better menu of offers. In particular, the total effect would
reduce the gap by 0.8 log-points (or 4.9% ) on average in the first 5 years of a career, and
by 1.4 log-points (or 4.7%) in years 11-15, where most of gains are due to the improvements
in human capital prices which are set endogenously by the firms.
5.2 Quantifying the components of the gap
Based on the estimates of the structural parameters, we use the model to analyze the drivers
of the life-cycle gender wage gap. First, we perform a decomposition of the gap into three
additive parts, reflecting differences in human capital level, differences in wage rates due
to jobs segregation, and differences in wage rates due to statistical discrimination. Let us
denote with wd = ydzd the wages received by workers of gender d ∈ {f,m} and let Γmen
23 Recall that college educated women have 1.3725 children upon 15 years of being in the labor force (see
Table 1 in Section 2).
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Figure 6: More maternity leaves with job-protection
(a) Average human capital (b) Average human capital price (c) The gender wage gap
Note: The figure shows the effect of equalizing the parameter η—that governs the availability of
the maternity leave with job protection,— to the level of men; a 16.2% increase. Panel (a) shows
the effect on human capital profile, Panel (b) shows the effect on the average wage rate profile; in
Panel(c), the baseline gap in log-wages between men and women is depicted with a solid blue line,
the dotted red line shows the partial effect of a change in the parameter whereas the dashed green
line shows the total effect that includes equilibrium responses of the firms.
denote the distribution of firm productivities in the men’s labor market.
gap = log(wm)− log(wf ) (8)
= log(ym) + log(zm)− log(yf )− log(zf )
= log(ym)− log(yf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gap in human capital
+ log(zf ) |Γmen − log(zf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
jobs segregation
+ log(zm)− log(zf ) |Γmen︸ ︷︷ ︸
statistical discrimination
The first component in ?? above reflects the differences in human capital levels accumu-
lated by men and women over their careers. The second and the third components together
represent the differences in the prices that men and women receive in the labor market for
their units of human capital, where we distinguish between (i) the effect of job segregation—
the gap in wage rates that is due to the fact that women don’t work in the same jobs as
men, and (ii) the effect of statistical discrimination—the gap in wage rates that arises due
to differential wage-setting by the firms, even if women were employed in exactly the same
jobs as men. Figure 7 illustrates this decomposition over the life-cycle where the solid black
line represents the total gap, and the gray areas below it represent the three additive com-
ponents outlined above. On average, over the first 15 years of a career, 45% of the gap is
explained by the differential wage setting by the firms, in response to gender differences in
turnover and human capital process. The segregation of jobs accounts for 28% of the gap
and the remaining 26% is due to differences in human capital profiles. The latter component
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is cumulative, it more than doubles towards the end of our horizon, when it accounts for
42% of the gap. This gap in human capital levels is the main driver of the total gap expan-
sion, explaining 72% of it, and the remaining 28% of the expansion are due to the fact that
men and women climb different wage ladders, and over time women increasingly fall behind
men in terms of earned human capital price. This divergence is entirely explained by the
statistical discrimination mechanism which compresses women’s wage rates especially at the
higher rungs of the ladder. The flow output in these high-productivity jobs is higher—both
because the firms themselves are more productive, and because workers employed in these
jobs tend to be more experienced. Therefore, match stability is especially valuable for these
firms, and they will discount the wage rates of high-turnover group more.
Figure 7: Log wage gap - contribution of human capital, market segregation and statistical dis-
crimination
Note: The figure shows the total log wage gap (black solid line) and its components - the gap due to
segregation (dark gray area), the gap due to statistical discrimination (gray area) and the gap due to
human capital differences (light gray area). The dashed line represents the gap due to human capital
prices.
As highlighted before, our model allows men and women to differ along a number of
broad dimensions— fertility shocks, transition rates, human capital technology, and firm
productivity. To quantify the contribution of each dimension to the overall gap, we perform
a series of counterfactual exercises by successively giving women the structural parameters
of men and simulating the model each time to assess the predicted gap under the new set of
parameters.
The effects of each of the four channels in isolation are shown in columns II-V of Ta-
ble 3. Gender differences in mobility explain a large portion of the wage gap: equalizing the
transition parameters between men and women reduces the wage gap by 61.2% on average
over the life-cycle. Gender segregation across firms of different productivities is also an im-
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portant factor and accounts for 26.5% of the average wage gap. Equalizing fertility-related
parameters and human capital technology between men and women reduces the wage gap
by 10% and 2.6%, respectively. In terms of the gap expansion, equalizing the human capital
accumulation rate seems the most effective policy: it reduces the gap expansion by almost a
half, by tilting women’s wage profiles upwards towards the end of the career, as illustrated
in Section 5.1.
Table 3: Closing the gap between men and women by equalizing their parameters
Equalized I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
– baseline
fertility 4 4 4 4 4
transitions 4 4 4 4 4
Γ(p) 4 4 4
ρ 4 4 4 4
Predicted
average gap 22.6 20.3 8.8 16.6 21.3 6.3 18.8 5.8 −0.6 −3.8
gap opening 17.6 16.0 14.1 17.6 8.7 12.1 6.4 4.5 1.18 1.7
combined effect∑ separate effects 1.01 1.06 1.11 1.05 1.13
Note: The table reports the gender wage gap in log-points when different sets of parameters are equal-
ized. Column I shows the gap predicted by the model at baseline values; column II equalizes the fertility
parameters of women to the level of men; column III equalizes the labor mobility parameters to the level
of men; column IV equalizes the distribution of firms’ productivities and column V equalizes the human
capital accumulation rate. Then, in columns VI–VIII we additively equalize the same sets of parameters,
one by one. Column VIII shows the predicted gap when all but one of the women’s parameters have
been equalized to the level of men, namely, the flow value of non-employment, b. Equalizing b closes the
gap completely. The last row of the column computes the ratio of the gap reduction under combined
policy to the sum of the gap reductions under the components of the policy.
As columns VI-X show, there are complementarities between the channels, especially
between human capital accumulation rate and transition rates. The combined effect of these
two channels is 11% higher than the sum of the separate effects. With a higher human capital
accumulation rate, an improvement in the transition rates of women brings about a stronger
reduction of the gap (column VIII vs column V) than the same improvement when ρ is low
(column III vs column I). When human capital accumulates faster, any given increase in
actual experience due to more stable employment increases average human capital stock by
more. At the same time, firms value match stability more when employees’ human capital
grows faster and respond with a better distribution of offers.24 This complementarity is
quantitatively weaker when the human capital accumulation rate is equalized in conjunction
with the fertility channel (column VII), because the latter does not lead to a substantial
24 The intuition also works vice versa—with more stable employment, the benefits of a higher human
capital accumulation rate will be more salient for both firms and workers.
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increase in the accumulation of actual experience nor in the expected match durations.
As shown in column X of Table 3, the higher human capital accumulation rate also boosts
the efficiency of the rest of the channels combined—and this policy leads to a 13% stronger
reduction in the gap than the sum of separate policies implies.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the differential wage growth between men and women distinguishing
between the human capital and frictional components of the gap, while accounting for the
equilibrium response of firms to the differences in labor market behaviors between men and
women.
We find that the human capital prices channel—wage rates set by the firms for men
and women—are a major source of the gender wage disparities. We also find that these
endogenous wage-setting decisions are an important transmission channel through which
policies impact individual labor market outcomes. Counterfactual exercises demonstrate
that disregarding these effects leads to erroneous conclusions about the impact of various
policies that target the gap, especially with respect to workers at the beginning of their
careers.
Fertility-related career interruptions have a non-negligible effect on the life-cycle gap.
The model predicts that if women had the same patterns of fertility-related interruptions as
men, the gap would by approximately 10% lower at all levels of experience and it will widen
less over the life-cycle. However, the most effective policy to narrow the gap in log-wages
would be to equalize the transition rates across genders and to reduce the jobs segregation by
gender. Differences in transition parameters (job-finding and separation rates) account for
63.8% of the gap in years 1-15 of a career. The differences in separation rates are particularly
important. In fact, eliminating the 58% difference in the separation rates, and encouraging
women to work in exactly the same firms as men, would be enough to eliminate the entire
gender wage gap in the first 15 years of potential experience, according to the model.
The key insight of the model is that the two sides of the labor market determine the
endogenous job ladder and we cannot predict the effect of a policy without filtering the
forces exerted by both workers and firms through the model in equilibrium. To improve the
labor market outcomes of women, we need a more holistic picture of how policies impact
careers, and the framework developed in this paper attempts to take a step in that direction.
The results of the numerical analysis highlight the importance of the gender differences
in separation rates and the differences in the types of jobs employing men and women. This
warrants a more detailed analysis of these two phenomena. In fact, the recent literature
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recognizes the importance of firm heterogeneity for the gender wage gap and its life-cycle
dynamics (Barth, Kerr, and Olivetti (2017), Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016)). The detailed
analysis of the job-separation decisions of men and women is still an open area of research.
Finally, there are a number of potentially endogenous margins that are fixed in our
analysis, such as the decision to promote, to provide job-protected maternity leave, to hire
or to lay a worker off. Endogenizing these margins, as well as allowing for more endogeneity
on the workers’ side, such as investment in human capital or timing of childbirth, is left for
future research.
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A Appendix
B Sample Restrictions
NLSY79 oversamples minorities and military personnels. We only use the “Non-black, non-
Hispanic” sample, and also drop the poor and military samples.
We define potential experience starting from the year the person leaves full-time educa-
tion, that is, potential experience = age - years_of_schooling - 6.
We focus on the first 15 years of potential experience. We drop people who had children
before leaving school, and drop those who have not worked at all in the 15 years after school.
B.1 Education
We focus on two education groups - high-school graduates (12 to 15 years of schooling) and
college graduates (16 to 20 years of schooling). The variable educated takes on values 0 or
1, respectively.
B.2 Price index
We take the quarterly Consumer Price Index, and evenly spread the change in prices over
weeks of each given quarter.
B.3 Employment status
We consider a person working in a particular week (working=1) if he/she is associated with
an employer in this week, and the wage data is not missing. We consider a person not working
(working=0) if he/she is either unemployed, or OLF (the model does not distinguish between
these two states), or “associated with employer, but dates missing”. The variable "working"
takes on the value "missing" if a person is in the military, or when no info is given regarding
the employment status.
B.4 Transitions
For each week of potential experience we compute the number of people employed in this week
(working=1) , the number of people nonnemployed (working=0), and the number of those
who make transitions, from current week to the next week. We consider three types of tran-
sitions: job-to-job, non-employment to employment, and employment-to-nonemployment.
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Then we divide the number of people making a transition by the corresponding denomina-
tor (employed or unemployed) in each week, to get weekly transition rates for each week.
Then we convert the weekly transition rates xw into the monthly rates xm according to the
formula:
xm = 1− (1− xm,1) ∗ (1− xm,2) ∗ (1− xm,3) ∗ (1− xm,4) (9)
where xm,i is the weekly transition rate in week i of month m The UE and EU transitions
are independent of experience in the model, therefore we compute the transition rates in
each month of potential experience, where the latter is between 1 and 15 years, and take
the average. The job-to-job transitions do depend on potential experience, through actual
experience - a higher actual experience implies a lower chance of getting an even better offer.
As specified in the Estimation section, the model produces a closed-form solution for the
job-to-job transition rate at each level of actual experience. The counterpart in the data
is computed by weeks and then months of actual experience by the same methodology as
above, and then averaged over 10 years of actual experience.
B.5 Maternity Leave variables
We assume that a woman is on ML if we observe her non-employed in any of the first
20 weeks of her child’s life. The fertility-related career interruption lasts till a woman is
observed working for at least 4 consecutive weeks. The career interruption is interpreted as
maternity leave if a woman comes back to her previous employer and as maternity leave plus
unemployed search if a woman had a kid in non-employment or is observed coming back to
work for another employer. If a woman was observed non-working in the weeks preceding
birth, these weeks are counted as ML as well up to 13 weeks (three months) before the birth
of the child. Beyond that time, a woman is considered non-employed. Since we use the
duration of fertility-related career interruptions in our identification, we stretch any such
spells beyond the 15 years window, and drop any individual for whom we do not observe the
spell ending before 2013 (the last period in our sample).
C Model Appendix
In this section, we show the properties of the model described in Section 3.
33
C.1 Linearity of the Value Functions
The productivity y of a woman initial ability ε ∼ A(ε), can be expressed as a product of two
components,
y = εeρx.
Therefore, when this woman is employed,
∂y
∂t
= ρy
The dynamic component in the value function of employed workers is given by
∂V (y, z)
∂t
=
∂V (y, z)
∂y
∂y
∂t
=
∂V (y, z)
∂y
ρy. (10)
An important feature of equation (10) is that the dynamic component is proportional to
woman’s productivity y.
Recall that the flow utilities in employment and unemployment – by and zy, – are linear
in y.
Combining (1) and (4), (4) and (2), we see that the value functions themselves are linear
in y and can be expressed as
U (y) = αUy,
V (y, z) = αE(z)y,
W JP (y, z) = αJP (z)y, and
WNJP (y) = αNJPy,
where αU and αNJP are numbers and αE(z), αJP (z) are some (yet unknown) functions of z.
We show how to derive these expressions below.
C.2 Derivations: Worker’s Side
In this Appendix we provide the proofs of Proposition 1 restated below.
Proposition 2. For a fixed F (·) with bounded and non-negative support, optimal job search
implies that
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(i) αE(z) is the solution to the differential equation
dαE(z)
dz
=
1
r + q(z)− ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
.25 (11)
(ii)
(
αNJP , αJP (zR), αU , zR
)
satisfy the following four equations,
αNJP =
bout + γ3α
U
r + φ+ γ3
, (12)
αJP (z) =
bout + γ2α
E(z) + γ1α
NJP
r + φ+ γ1 + γ2
, (13)[
ζ1(λu − λe)− ρλu + (r + φ)ζ2
]
αU = λuz
R − λeb+
[
ζ2 +
γ1(λu − λe)
r + φ+ γ3
]
bout, (14)
ζ1α
U = b+
γ1
r + φ+ γ3
bout + λu
∫ z
zR
F (z)
r + q(z)− ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
dz. (15)
where ζ1 = r + φ + γ1 − γ1γ3r+φ+γ3 , and ζ2 =
λuγ1η(γ3−γ2)
(r+φ+γ3)(r+φ+γ1+γ2)
. Using the above four
equations, the reservation wage zR is implicitly defined by
ζ1
(
zR − b)+ (r + φ)ζ2
λu
(bout − b) + ρ
(
b+
γ1
r + φ+ γ3
bout
)
=
[
ζ1(λu − λe)− ρλu + (r + φ)ζ2
] ∫ z
zR
F (z)
r+q(z)−ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
dz. (16)
Proof. The separable forms of the value functions (see Appendix C.1) imply we can simplify
the women workers’ value functions (1), (2), (3) and (4) into expressions below,
(r + φ)αU = b+ λu
∫ z
zR
(αE(z)− αU)dF (z′) + γ1 · (αNJP − αU), (17)
(r + φ)αE(z) = z + ραE(z) + λe
∫ z
z
(αE(z′)− αE(z))dF (z′) (18)
+ γ1(ηα
JP (z) + (1− η)αNJP − αE(z)) + δ (αU − αE(z)) ,
(r + φ)αNJP = bout + γ3 · (αU − αNJP ), (19)
25The boundary condition is
αE(z) =
z + γ1b
out
r+φ+γ2
+
[
γ1γ2[γ1+γ3+(1−η)(r+φ+γ2)]
(r+φ+γ2)(r+φ+γ1+γ2)
+ δ
]
αU
r + φ+ γ1 + δ − ρ− ηγ1γ2r+φ+γ1+γ2
,
and given the boundary condition, the solution is unique.
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(r + φ)αJP (z) = bout + γ2(α
E(z)− αJP (z)) + γ1(αNJP − αJP (z)) (20)
Equations (19) and (20) yield (12) and (13) in Proposition 1.
Rearranging and differentiating (18) with respect to z,
(
r − ρ+ γ1 + δ + φ+ λeF (z)
) dαE(z)
dz
= 1 + γ1η
dαJP (z)
dz
. (21)
Using the derivative of (13) with respect to z, we get the expression in (11). The boundary
condition is obtained by evaluating (18) at the highest offer, z.
Note that any unemployed woman would accept all offers above some reservation rate zR,
so her value in unemployment exactly equals the value of working under the lowest acceptable
wage, i.e. she has a reservation rate strategy that satisfies αE(zR) = αU . Evaluating the
value function for the employed (18) at the reservation wage,
(r + φ)αE(zR) = zR + ραU + λe
z∫
zR
(αE(z′)− αU)dF (z′)
+ γ1(ηα
JP (zR) + (1− η)αNJP − αU).
(14) can be easily obtained by combining the above equation with (17). Finally, integrating
(17) by parts yields equation (15).
Equations (11) to (15) in Proposition 1 make a system of five equations in five unknowns,
zR and αU , given F (z). Together they yield (16).
Next, we obtain a useful expression for αU , by evaluating the value function for the
employed (18) at the reservation wage of the unemployed, zR,
rαU = zR + ραU + λe
∫ z
zR
(αE(z′)− αU)dF (z′)
+ γ1(ηα
JP (zR) + (1− η)αNJP − αU)− φαU .
Simplifying and using (17),
αU =
λuz
R − λeb+
[
ζ2 +
γ1(λu−λe)
r+φ+γ3
]
bout
ζ1(λu − λe)− ρλu + (r + φ)ζ2 .
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C.3 Characterization of Steady-State Measures and Distributions
In this section we provide details on the claims presented in Section 3.2.
Claim 1. i) Workers are in one of four states while in the labor market
mU +mE +mJP +mNJP = 1,
ii) The flows into and out of JP balance
ηγ1mE = (φ+ γ1 + γ2)mJP ,
iii) The flows into and out of employment balance
λumU + γ2mJP = (φ+ δ + γ1)mE, and
iv) The flows into and out of unemployment balance
φ+ δ mE + γ3mNJP = (φ+ γ1 + λu)mU .
Proof. (i), (ii) and (iii) can be easily established by equating inflows and outflows from each
state in the economy.
Balancing inflow and outflow from unprotected maternity leave,
mUγ1 + (1− η)γ1mE + γ1mJP = (φ+ γ3)mNJP . (22)
which together with (i), (ii) and (iii), imply that
mE
mU
=
λu
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2
.
Using (ii) in the equation above yields (iv).
Similarly, for a given level of experience x, the following balance-flow conditions must
hold in equilibrium
i) The flows into and out of unemployment balance
φ+ δ mE H(x) + γ3mNJP N
NJP (x) = (φ+ γ1 + λu)mU N(x),
ii) The flows into and out of employment balance
λumU N(x) + γ2mJP N
JP (x) = (φ+ δ + γ1)mE H(x) +mE
dH(x)
dx
,
iii) The flows into and out of JP balance
ηγ1mE H(x) = (φ+ γ1 + γ2)mJP N
JP (x),
iv) The flows into and out of NJP balance
γ1mU N(x) + (1− η)γ1mE H(x) + γ1mJP NJP (x) = (φ+ γ3)mNJP NNJP (x), and
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v) The flows into and out of employment with wage rates below z balance
λumU N(x)F (z) + γ2mJP H
JP (x, z) = q(z)mE H(x, z) +mE
dH(x,z)
dx
.
Proposition 3. The steady-state distributions are characterized below.
i) Distributions of experience x among unemployed and employed women are, respectively,
H(x) = 1− e−ζ4x (23)
N(x) = 1−
(
1− ζ4
λU
mE
mU
)
e−ζ4x (24)
where ζ4 is given by
ζ4 =
φ(φ+ γ3)λu
[φ(φ+ γ1 + γ3) + λu(φ+ γ3)]mE
.
ii) The distribution of experience among women at home with job protection is given by
NJP (x) =
mE
mJP
(
ηγ1
φ+ γ1 + γ2
)
H(x).
iii) The distribution of experience among women at home without job protection is given
by
NNJP (x) =
(φ+ γ1 + λu)mU N(x)− δ mEH(x)− φ
γ3mNJP
.
Proof. The inflow into employment over a small unit of time, dt, consists of women with job
protection finishing maternity leave and coming back to their previous jobs, mJPNJP (x)γ2dt,
and unemployed women who have less than x units of experience who have found a job,
mUN(x)λudt. The outflow from H(x) over dt, consists of women being fired, retiring, and
getting a child shock, mEH(x) (φ+ δ + γ1) dt, and women who remain employed and whose
experience grows above x during dt, mE (H(x+ dt)−H(x)). In addition there is some
probability that both of the events conforming the outflow take place, but this possibility is
of second order of magnitude relative to dt, we denote it by O(dt2).
Balancing inflow and outflow,
(
γ2mJPN
JP (x) + λumUN(x)
)
dt = mE
[
(φ+ δ + γ1)H(x)dt+ (H(x+ dt)−H(x))
]
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+O(dt2).
Using equation (24), (ii) and taking dt to zero, yields a first order ordinary differential
equation of H(x) with initial condition H(0) that can be written as
ζ4 = ζ5H(x) +
dH(x)
dx
where
ζ5 = (φ+ δ + γ1)− ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
−
(
δ (φ+ γ3) +
(
γ1+(1−η)(φ+γ2)
φ+γ1+γ2
)
γ1γ3
)
λu
λu (φ+ γ3) + φ (φ+ γ1 + γ3)
and, in fact, ζ4 = ζ5. Using as integrating factor eζ5x yields equation (23).
Next, we characterize N(x). The inflow into unemployment consists of all new-born
workers, φ, employed workers who get separated from their jobs and who have experience
less than x, δ mEH(x), and workers without job protection who have experience less than
x and who get an alleviation shock γ2, γ2mNJPNNJP (x). The outflow consists of unem-
ployed workers with experience less than x finding jobs, getting fertility shocks or retiring,
(φ+ γ1 + λu)mUN(x). Balancing inflow and outflow yields,
φ+ δ mE H(x) + γ3mNJP N
NJP (x) = (φ+ γ1 + λu)mU N(x)
Rearranging yields equation (24).
Next, consider the distribution of experiences among women at home with job protection,
NJP (x). The inflow to this state consists of employed workers with experience less than x
getting fertility shock with job protection, mEH(x)ηγ1 and the outflow are workers retiring
(at rate φ), coming back to their previous jobs (at rate γ2), or getting a second fertility shock
γ1 while in maternity leave. Balancing inflow and outflow yields (ii).
Consider the share of unemployed workers whose experience is below x, N(x). The inflow
consists of all workers joining the workforce at rate φ together with employed workers whose
match was destroyed and have experience less than x, i.e. mEH(x)δ, and workers who
alleviate from maternity leave but had no job protection and have experience less than x so
that they re-join the labor force in unemployment, mNJPNNJP (x)γ3. The outflow consists
of unemployed workers with experience less than x finding jobs, getting a fertility shock or
retiring, i.e. mUN(x) (φ+ γ1 + λu). Balancing inflow and outflow yields (iii).
Proposition 4. For a fixed F (·) with bounded and non-negative support, optimal job search
implies that
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i) The joint distribution of experiences and wage rates among employed women H(x, z)
is given by
H(x, z) =
mU
mE
λuF (z)
(
1
s(z)
(
1− e−s(z)x)− (1− R1
λU
mE
mU
)
1
s(z)−R1
(
e−R1x − e−s(z)x))
where s(z) = q(z)− ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
.
ii) The joint distribution of experiences and wage rates among women who are on mater-
nity leave with job protections coincides with the joint distribution of experiences and
wage rates of employed women, HJP (x, z) = H(x, z).
Proof. The inflow into the pool of employed women with experience less than x earning
wage rate below z consists of unemployed workers who have experience less than x and
who find a job at the wage rate below z, mUN(x)λuF (z)dt; and workers with experience
less than x coming back from protected maternity leave to their old employer who paid
them wage rate below z, mJPγ2HJP (x, z)dt. The outflow from the pool H(x, z) consists
of workers in H(x, z) retiring, separating into unemployment, getting child shock or finding
better jobs, mEH(x, z)q(z)dt where q(z) = φ+δ+γ1+λe (1− F (z)) and workers who remain
employed at wage rate below z, but whose experience grows over dt and becomes just above
x mE (H(x, z)−H(x− dt, z)). Finally, there is a term that says that all these outflow events
can happen simultaneously, but this probability is of the second order of magnitude relative
to dt, we denote it by O (dt2). Balancing inflows and outflows
mJPγ2H
JP (x, z)dt+mUN(x)λuF (z)dt = mEH(x, z)q(z)dt+mE
(
H(x, z)−H(x− dt, z))
+O
(
dt2
)
.
Using ηγ1mE
φ+γ1+γ2
= mJP ,
ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
HJP (x, z) +
mU
mE
N(x)λuF (z) = H(x, z)q(z) +
∂H(x, z)
dx
. (25)
Note that the inflow into job-protected maternity leave are employed workers getting a
fertility shock with job protection, γ1ηmEH(x, z) and the outflow are workers in HJP (x, z)
retiring (φ), getting a fertility shock while in maternity leave (γ1), or coming back to their
old employer (γ2). Balancing inflow and outflow,
γ1ηmEH(x, z) = (γ1 + γ2 + φ)mJPH
JP (x, z),
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which using (ii) from Claim 1 yields (ii).
Using (ii), (25) becomes a first order differential equation of H(x, z) with initial condition
H(0, z) = 0, which, using as integrating factor e
(
q(z)− ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
)
x, yields (i).
C.4 Derivations: Firm’s Side
To solve for the equilibrium and show that the policy function ξ(p) is defined by equation (26),
we start by providing closed form expressions for the profit function of a firm of productivity
p from posting an offer z,
pi(z; p) = yinit(z)yacc(z)(p− z),
where, recall, yinit(z) denotes the the expected productivity with which a new hire will start
her career at the firm, and yacc(z) denotes the human capital that accumulates from the
workforce hired at wage rate z in the firm.
The first term, yinit(z) is given by
yinit(z) = mUλu
∫ ε
ε
ε
(∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
dN(x′)
)
dA(ε) +mEλe
∫ ε
ε
ε
(∫ z
zR
∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
d2H(x′, z′)
)
dA(ε)
Since the pool of potential hires consists of both employed and unemployed workers. where
the first term describes the average human capital of workers recruited from the pool of
unemployed, and the second term refers to workers poached from firms paying a wage rate
below z. Recall that workers are heterogeneous in their initial productivity ε with exogenous
distribution A(ε). Here we denote expected initial productivity by ε˜ and
∫ ∞
0
eρx
′
dN(x′) =
ζ4
ζ4 − ρ
(
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1·γ2φ+γ1+γ2 − ρ
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)
,
and ∫ ∞
0
eρx
′ ∂H(x′, z)
∂x
dx =
mU
mE
· λuF (z)
q(z)− ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
− ρ
[
1 +
n2ρ
(ζ4 − ρ)
]
, 26
Therefore,
yinit(z) =
ε˜mUλuζ4
ζ4 − ρ
(
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2 − ρ
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)(
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2 − ρ+ λe
q(z)− ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
− ρ
)
.
26Recall that n2 = 1− ζ4λu mEmU .
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Let us denote
M(z) = q(z)− ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
− ρ, and
ζ6 =
ε˜mUλuζ4
ζ4 − ρ
(
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2 − ρ
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)(
φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
− ρ+ λe
)
,
so that yinit(z) = ζ6/M(z) and let us now derive in detail the expression (??) for yacc(z).
Note that the accumulated human capital at the firm depends on the duration of the
match with the members of its workforce. For a match lasting τ periods, the worker ac-
cumulates the stream
∫ τ
0
eρtdt of human capital.27 The firm thus reaps the benefits from
this accumulated human capital with some probability: the probability of a match lasting τ
periods. Note that if the match ends after τ periods with job-protected maternity leave, with
some probability, the worker will come back to her previous job in period τ ′ at which point,
the match “resets” and the firm can reap benefits from the accumulation of human capital
of this worker in this “second” job-spell at the firm. Algebraically, let (P1(τ) +P2(τ)) denote
the probability that the match lasts exactly τ periods, with P1(τ) denoting the probability
that the match lasts τ and is terminated for reasons other than fertility with job protection,
and P2(τ), the probability that the match lasts τ , and is terminated job-protected fertility,
in which case, with probability P3(τ ′), the woman will come back to her previous job in
period τ ′. Then,
yacc(z) =
∫ ∞
τ=0
(
(P1(τ) + P2(τ))
∫ τ
0
eρtdt + P2(τ)e
ρτ
∫ ∞
τ ′=0
P3(τ
′)yacc(z)dτ ′
)
dτ.
Where the probability that the match lasts τ and is terminated for reasons other than job-
protected fertility is P1(τ) =
(
φ+ δ + γ1 (1− η) + λeF (z)
)
e−q(z)τ , the probability that the
match lasts τ , and is terminated job-protected fertility is given by P2(τ) = ηγ1eq(z)τ , and
the probability that the woman will come back to her previous job in period τ ′ is given by28
27 Suppose that the worker may have entered the firm with human capital y = εeρx0 . If she works for
exactly τ periods, her human capital increases to y¯ = εeρ(x0+τ), and from this one particular worker, the
firm would have earned profits εeρ(x0+t)(p − z) at each “instant” t ∈ (0, τ). Thus, the contribution of this
one worker to yacc(z) would be
εeρ(x0+t)(p− z)
(p− z)εeρx0 =
εeρ(x0+t)
εeρx0
= eρt for each “instant” t ∈ (0, τ),
or
∫ τ
0
eρtdt.
28 Note that it is immaterial—for yacc(z),—to consider the time before the worker actually comes back
to the job as no human capital is accumulated while she is in ML. Thus, rather than considering the actual
period τ˜ > τ in which the worker rejoins the labor market, we simply restart counting her tenure at the job
with a τ ′ ∈ R+.
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P3(τ
′) = γ2e−γ2τ
′
e−(φ+γ1)τ
′ . Thus yielding the following recursive expression for yacc(z),
yacc(z) =
1
ρ
[
q(z)
q(z)− ρ − 1
]
+
ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
· y
acc(z)
q(z)− ρ.
So that yacc(z) = 1/M(z) and
pi(z; p) =
ζ6
M(z)2
(p− z).
Where `(z) =
ζ6
M(z)
M(z)
= ζ6
M(z)2
is strictly increasing in z, implying that the optimal wage policy
is increasing in p and more productive firms post higher wage offers.
Recall that we denote the optimal wage rate offer function by ξ(p). In equilibrium, for
any z ∈ [zR, z], F (z) = F (ξ(p)) = Γ(p). Let the profits from posting an optimal offer ξ(p)
by pi∗(ξ(p)). By the envelope theorem, ∂pi
∗(ξ(p))
∂p
= `(ξ(p)). Integrating back, and using that
pi∗(ξ(p)) = (p− zR)`(zR)
pi∗(ξ(p)) =
∫ p
zR
`(ξ(x))dx =
∫ p
zR
ζ6
M(ξ(x))2
dx.
Note that pi∗(ξ(p)) = (p− ξ(p))`(ξ(p)) implies that
ξ(p) = p− pi
∗(ξ(p))
`(ξ(p))
= p−
∫ p
zR
ζ6
M(ξ(x))2
dx
ζ6
M(ξ(p))2
. (26)
The above equation gives the optimal wage policy of a firm of productivity p, given the
reservation wage rate of women, zR. Notice that we should separately regard the case in
which zR < p, where
pi∗(ξ(p))
`(ξ(p))
=
(p−zR)
M(ξ(p)2
+
∫ p
p
1
M(ξ(x))2
dx
1
M(ξ(p))2
, (27)
and
M(ξ(p)) = φ+ δ + γ1 − ηγ1γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
− ρ+ λe.
We obtain an additional equation on zR and Γ(p) to close the system in Proposition 5
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below.
Proposition 5. The following equation characterizes zR,
(γ3−γ2)γ1η
r+φ+γ1+γ2
· (bout − b) = (b− zR) (r + φ+ γ1 + γ3)− ρb (r + φ+ γ3) + γ1bout
r + φ
+ ζ7
[ (
p− zR)
M(ξ(p))2
∫ p
p
(1− Γ(x))(
q(ξ(x)) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)Ψ(x)dx
+
∫ p
p
(1− Γ(x))(
q(ξ(x)) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
) (∫ x
p
1
M(ξ(r))2
dr
)
Ψ(x)dx
]
with ζ7 = (λu − λe) (r + φ+ γ1 + γ3)− ρ(r+φ+γ3)λur+φ + (γ3−γ2)ηλuγ1r+φ+γ1+γ2 and Ψ(p) = 2λeΓ′(p)M(ξ(p)).
Proof. We prove the claim by combining the ξ(p) from above with equation (16), changing
the variable of integration from z to p, using the formula:
∫ φ(b)
φ(a)
f(x)dx =
∫ b
a
f(φ(t))φ′(t)dt,
∫ z
zR
(1− F (z))(
q(z) + r − ρ− η·γ1·γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)dz = ∫ p
p
(1− Γ(x))(
q(x) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)ξ′(x)dx (28)
Using the equation for optimal wage function (26), we find the derivative ξ′(p) given by
ξ′(p) =
( (
p− zR)
M(ξ(p))2
+
∫ p
p
1
M(ξ(x))2
dx
)
×Ψ(p)
where Ψ(p) = 2λeΓ′(p)M(ξ(p)). Summing up using (16),
(γ3 − γ2) γ1η
r + φ+ γ1 + γ2
· (bout − b) = (b− zR) (r + φ+ γ1 + γ3)− ρb (r + φ+ γ3) + γ1bout
r + φ
+ ζ7
∫ z¯
zR
F (z)(
q(z) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)
where
ζ7 = (λu − λe) (r + φ+ γ1 + γ3)− ρ (r + φ+ γ3)λu
r + φ
+
(γ3 − γ2) ηλuγ1
r + φ+ γ1 + γ2
.
Then, using (28),
(γ3 − γ2) γ1η
r + φ+ γ1 + γ2
· (bout − b) = (b− zR) (r + φ+ γ1 + γ3)− ρb (r + φ+ γ3) + γ1bout
r + φ
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+ζ7
[ (
p− zR)
M(ξ(p))2
∫ p
p
(1− Γ(x))(
q(x) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)Ψ(x)dx
+
∫ p
p
(1− Γ(x))(
q(x) + r − ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
) (∫ x
p
1
M(ξ(r))2
dr
)
Ψ(x)dx
]
.
We can rewrite this expression so that zR appears on both sides using ξ′1(p) and ξ′2(p),
(r + φ)
(
r+φ+γ3+γ1
r+φ+γ3
)
λuzR−λeb+ γ1λ_uηb
out
r+φ+γ1+γ2
+
[
(λu−λe)− ηλu(r+φ+γ2)r+φ+γ1+γ2
]
γ1b
out
r+φ+γ3
(λu−λe)
(
r+φ+γ1− γ1γ3r+φ+γ3
)
−ρλu+ (r+φ)(γ3−γ2)r+φ+γ3
ηλuγ1
r+φ+γ1+γ2
= b+
γ1b
out
r + φ+ γ3
+ λu
(
(p−zR)ζ6
φ+δ+γ1+λe−ρ− γ1γ2ηφ+γ1+γ2+c
∫ p
p
(1−Γ(x))(
q(x)+r−ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)ξ′1(x)dx
+
∫ p
p
(1−Γ(x))(
q(x)+r−ρ− ηγ1γ2
r+φ+γ1+γ2
)ξ′2(x)dx
)
. (29)
(29) gives the explicit solution for zR, given the parameters and the distribution of produc-
tivities Γ(p). Once zR has been solved for, for each p ∈ [p, p] we find the corresponding
optimal z = ξ(p) using (26).
D Details of Estimation
D.1 Estimation directly from the Data
First, the average number of children that a woman has over the course of 15 years in the
labor market uniquely determines γ1 in each gender-education subgroup.
Next, note that monthly transition probabilities— the probabilities to make a transition
over the course of a month—and durations of different states can be expressed through the
model Poisson rates parameters and the rate of job protection η.
In particular, the probability to move from unemployment to employment over the course
of a month, DUtoE is given by
DUtoE =
λu
φ+ γ1 + λu
· (1− e−(φ+γ1+λu)) . (30)
Thus given φ, γ1 and DUtoE —which can be obtained from the data,—we can solve for λu.
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A similar approach given φ and γ1 yields δ using the probability to move from employment
into unemployment over the course of a month, DEtoU ,
DEtoU =
δ
φ+ δ + γ1
· (1− e−(φ+δ+γ1)) . (31)
and γ2 from the average duration of the job protected maternity leave,
E(JP duration) =
1
φ+ γ1 + γ2
. (32)
Then, given given φ, γ1 and λu we solve for γ3 using the average duration of a maternity
career interruptions that started in unemployment, involved only one birth and ended in
employment, E(NJP duration), which is given by
E(NJP duration) =
1
(φ+ γ1 + γ3)
+
1
(φ+ γ1 + λu)
.
And given φ, γ1 and γ2, we solve for η using the share of women observed returning to their
previous employer after having a child given by,
P(Come back) =
η · γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
. (33)
Getting at λe is not as straight forward but we can derive it from the data as follows.
First note that the probability that a job offering a wage rate z ends in a job-to-job
transition after a duration of τ is given by
P(τ) = λe(1− F (z)) · e−λe(1−F (z))τe−(φ+δ+γ1)τ .
So the proportion of those who do a job-to-job transition from jobs paying z over one unit
of time is given by,
DEtoE(z) =
∫ 1
0
λe(1− F (z)) · e−λe(1−F (z))τe−(φ+δ+γ1)τdτ
= − λe(1− F (z))
φ+ δ + γ1 + λe(1− F (z)) · e
−(φ+δ+γ1+λe(1−F (z)))·τ
∣∣∣1
0
=
λe(1− F (z))
φ+ δ + γ1 + λe(1− F (z)) ·
(
1− e−(φ+δ+γ1+λe(1−F (z))))
=
λe(1− F (z))
q(z)
· (1− e−(φ+δ+γ1+λe(1−F (z)))) ,
and, overall in the economy, the proportion of workers moving from one job to another at
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level of actual experience x is
DEtoE|x =
∫ z
z
DEtoE(z)dH(z|x), (34)
where H(z|x) is the distribution of accepted wage rates conditional on actual experiences.
Note that z enters DEtoE(z) only through F (z)—i.e. we could re-write DEtoE(z) as a
function D˜EtoE(F (z)). The key feature that allows us to obtain an expression of λe that
has a data-counterpart is that z enters H(z|x) only through F (z) as well. Thus dH(z|x) is
a function of parameters, F (z) and it is proportional to f(z), which allows for the integral
to be solved for and does not depend on F (z).29 We derive the expression below, however,
the intuition behind this is as follows. The transition rate from job-to-job depends on the
relative ranking (say, percentile) of a current wage rate in the distribution of offers, F (z)—
the higher the percentile, the lower is the mass of attractive offers, and the lower is the chance
to make a job-to-job transition. At the beginning of a career, or at any time when hired from
non-employment, workers have an equal chance to get an offer from any percentile (a chance
of 1/100 precisely), and when looked at some time afterwards, their current relative position
in the distribution will only be a function of the speed of ascent (λe) and the intensities of
events that disrupt the ascent (separations and child shocks). To sum up, the shape of F
and its support have no bearing on the rate of job-to-job transitions since the latter only
depends on the relative position (e.g. percentile) of the current wage rate in the distribution.
Formally, our expression for λe is derived as follows.
Let ω = ηγ1γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
, R = φ(φ+γ3)λu
[φ(φ+γ1+γ3)+λu(φ+γ3)]mE
and n2 = 1− Rφ+δ+γ1−ω . Then the distribu-
tion of wage rates conditional on actual experience levels is given by
H(z|x) = (φ+ δ + γ1 − ω)F (z)
(
1− e−(q(z)−ω)·x
q(z)− ω −
n2 · (e−R·x − e−(q(z)−ω)·x)
q(z)− ω −R
)/
H(x).
where H(x) = 1− e−Rx. Thus
H(z|x)dz = (φ+ δ + γ1 − ω)
H(x)
[(
1− e−(q(z)−ω)·x
q(z)− ω −
n2 · (e−R·x − e−(q(z)−ω)·x)
q(z)− ω −R
)
− λeF (z)
(
e(q(z)−ω)x
{
−x(q(z)− ω) + 1
(q(z)− ω)2 − n2
x(q(z)− ω −R) + 1
(q(z)− ω −R)2
}
29By the second part of the fundamental theorem of calculus, the integral of
DEtoE(z)dH(z|x) = D˜EtoE(F (z))H˜(F (z)|x)f(z)dz is the difference between the anti-derivative of
D˜EtoE(F (z))H˜(F (z)|x)f(z)dz—which does not depend on F (z)—evaluated at z and at z.
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− 1
(q(z)− ω)2 −
e−R
(q(z)− ω −R)2
)]
f(z)dz
because q′(z) = −λef(z). To algebraically show that (34) does not depend on F (z), following
Hornstein et al. (2011), consider the change of variable given by t = F (z) so that (F−1)′(t) =
1
f(z)
. It follows that
dH(z|x) = (φ+ δ + γ1 − ω)
H(x)
[(
1− e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x
q˜(t)− ω −
n2 · (e−R·x − e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x)
q˜(t)− ω −R
)
− λet
(
e(q˜(t)−ω)x
{
−x(q˜(t)− ω) + 1
(q˜(t)− ω)2 − n2
x(q˜(t)− ω −R) + 1
(q˜(t)− ω −R)2
}
− 1
(q˜(t)− ω)2 −
e−R
(q˜(t)− ω −R)2
)]
dt
where q˜(t) = φ+ δ + γ1 + λe(1− t).
Thus, under the proposed change of variables t = F (z),
DEtoE|x =
∫ z
z
DEtoE(z)dH(z|x)
=
∫ F−1(z)
F−1(z)
DEtoE(F
−1(z))
[(
1− e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x
q˜(t)− ω −
n2 · (e−R·x − e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x)
q˜(t)− ω −R
)
− λet
(
e(q˜(t)−ω)x
{
−x(q˜(t)− ω) + 1
(q˜(t)− ω)2 − n2
x(q˜(t)− ω −R) + 1
(q˜(t)− ω −R)2
}
− 1
(q˜(t)− ω)2 −
e−R
(q˜(t)− ω −R)2
)]
dt,
with
DEtoE(t) =
λe(1− t)
q˜(t)
· (1− e−(φ+δ+γ1+λe(1−t))) .
Therefore,
DEtoE|x =
∫ z
z
λe·(1−F (z))
q(z)
· (1− e−q(z))F ′(z)
e−(q(z)−ω)·x +
n2·(R·e−R·x−(q(z)−ω)e−(q(z)−ω)·x)
q(z)−ω−R
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×
[(
e−(q(z)−ω)·x +
n2 ·
(
R · e−R·x − (q(z)− ω) e−(q(z)−ω)·x)
q(z)− ω −R
)
+ F (z)λe
(
e−(q(z)−ω)·x · x+ n2 ·R · e
−R·x
(q(z)− ω −R)2
− n2 · e−(q(z)−ω)·x
[
(q(z)− ω) · x (q(z)− ω −R) +R
(q(z)− ω −R)2
])]
dz
=
∫ z
z
λe·(1−t)
q(t)
· (1− e−q˜(t))
e−(φ+δ+γ1−ω)·x +
n2·(R·e−R·x−(φ+δ+γ1−ω)e−(φ+δ+γ1−ω)·x)
φ+δ+γ1−ω−R
×
[(
e−(q(t)−ω)·x +
n2 ·
(
R · e−R·x − (q˜(t)− ω) e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x)
q˜(t)− ω −R
)
+ tλe
(
e−(q(t)−ω)·x · x+ n2 ·R · e
−R·x
(q(t)− ω −R)2−
− n2 · e−(q˜(t)−ω)·x
[
(q˜(t)− ω) · x (q˜(t)− ω −R) +R
(q˜(t)− ω −R)2
])]
dt
which does not depend on F .
Job Duration = K ·

[
φ+γ1+γ2
η·γ1·γ2
]2
1
λe
· ln
(
φ+δ+γ1+λe
φ+δ+γ1
· φ+δ+γ1−
η·γ1·γ2
φ+γ1+γ2
φ+δ+γ1+λe− η·γ1·γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)
+
+φ+γ1+γ2
η·γ1·γ2
1(
φ+δ+γ1− η·γ1·γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)(
φ+δ+γ1+λe− η·γ1·γ2φ+γ1+γ2
)

where K =
(
φ+ δ + γ1 − η · γ1 · γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
)
·
(
φ+ δ + γ1 + λe − η · γ1 · γ2
φ+ γ1 + γ2
)
(35)
All the derivations above are based on the competing risk structure of the model - duration
of each spell is defined by the terminating event that occurs first (for example, the transition
from unemployment to employment will only happen if the job offer event λu will occur
before other competing events that terminate an unemployment spell, such as birth of a
child γ1 or permanent exit φ). The elegant mathematics of the Poisson processes allows to
concisely characterize the respective probabilities.
In this way, we have a system of six equations in six unknowns {γ2, γ3, λu, λe, δ, η}, linking
the unknown model parameters with turnover rates between employment and unemployment,
durations of protected and unprotected maternity leaves, average job-to-job transition rate
and the share of women coming back to their old employer after maternity leave. We solve
the system and with parameters in hand, proceed to the second stage of the estimation.
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D.2 Joint estimation via GMM
We adopt a two-stage efficient GMM procedure, where in the first step each of the 50
moments is weighted by the inverse of its variance in the data. In the second step, the efficient
weighting matrix is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the set of moments we
target, evaluated at the point estimate from the first step, θˆ1. Note however, that our
sample size is relatively small—N = 681 for women and N = 653 for men,—and that some
of our moments will be missing for many individuals, precluding the required computation of
covariances of the moments across individuals— for example, job-to-job transitions are very
scarce and so the job-to-job wage changes at some levels of actual experience will be missing
for all the workers that did not do a job-to-job transition at that level of experience. To deal
with this issue, we resort to bootstrap to compute the efficient weighting matrix.First, we
re-sample our data with replacement B times. Then, for each sample b = 1, . . . , B of size N ,
we compute the vector of moment conditions as the average of the individual-level moments,
evaluated at θˆ1 . Let g(Xb, θˆ1) = 1N
∑N
i=1 f(X
b
i , θˆ1) denote the 50× 1 vector of moments in a
bootstrapped sample b. Let G(X, β) be the 50×B matrix formed by the vectors g(Xb, θˆ1),
b = 1, . . . , B.
I.e.
G(X, β) =
(
g(X1, θˆ1), . . . , g(X
B, θˆ1)
)
,
where [G(X, β)]i,j corresponds to the i-th target moment of the j-th bootstrap sample.
Let Ω̂ be a 50× 50 matrix whose (m, `) entry is given by
Ω̂m` =
1
B
B∑
b=1
gm(X
b, θˆ1)g`(X
b, θˆ1)
p→ E
(
gm(X, θˆ1)g`(X, θˆ1)
)
.
Where gm(Xb, θˆ1) and g`(Xb, θˆ1) are the m-th and the `-th elements of a vector g(Xb, θˆ1).
Note that:
E
(
gm(X, θˆ1)g`(X, θˆ1)
)
= E
(
1
N2
(
N∑
i=1
fm(X
b
i , θˆ1)
)(
N∑
j=1
f`(X
b
j , θˆ1)
))
= E
(
1
N2
(
N∑
i=1
fm(X
b
i , θˆ1)f`(X
b
i , θˆ1) +
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
fm(X
b
i , θˆ1)f`(X
b
j , θˆ1)
))
= E
(
1
N2
N∑
i=1
fm(X
b
i , θˆ1)f`(X
b
i , θˆ1)
)
.
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Where the last equality follows from the fact that the moments are uncorrelated across
individuals. Thus
Ω̂m`
p→ 1
N
E (fm(X, θ)f`(X, θ)) =
1
N
E (fm(X, θ)f`(X, θ)) .
The above means that the efficient weighting matrix in the second step—the inverse of the
variance-covariance matrix of the moments—can be found as
W =
(
N · Ω̂
)−1
Let D = ∂
∂θ′E(f(Xn, θ)). The asymptotic variance of the GMM estimator is
Σ = (D′WD)−1D′WSWD(D′WD)−1.
To avoid numeric differentiation of the vector of moments, we compute the standard
errors of the estimates using bootstrap.
E Details of the Results
E.1 Women’s estimates
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Figure 8: Fit of the targeted moments for college-educated women
E.2 Men’s estimates
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Figure 9: Fit of the targeted moments for college-educated men
E.3 Counterfactual policy exercises
E.3.1 Increased arrival rate of offers for employed women
The job-finding rate of employed women, λe, is in fact higher than that of men’s. In Figure 10
we decrease λe by 7.9% to equalize if to men’s level. In terms of human capital levels, such
a change has no effect, since it does not affect the amount of actual experience that women
accumulate, as reflected in Figure 10a. At the same time, the effect on the human capital
prices would be substantial (see Figure 10b). For the firms, decreased efficiency of employed
search means less competition for employed workers: it is harder to poach workers, and at the
same time, firms’ employees are less likely to be poached. This decrease in competition pushes
the offers down. For the workers, the value of employment decreases, bringing the reservation
rate up, which exerts an upward pressure on the lower rungs of the ladder, dampening the
decrease of the lowest equilibrium offers. These effects are reflected in Figure 10b: the prices
profile decreases more for more experienced women—those who are more likely to reach the
higher rungs of the ladder—and becomes steeper relative to the benchmark.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates for College Educated men
Estimates from data Jointly estimated parameters
δ 0.0128 p 15.2111
(0.1106)
γ1 0.0071 p 68.8595
(6.1322)
γ2 0.5319 κ1 0.2869
(0.0112)
γ3 0.0842 κ2 35.4669
(1.5964)
λe 0.0322 ρ 0.0036
(0.0000)
λu 0.2373 ε 0.2722
(0.0016)
η 0.9555 ε 51.0753
(0.0152)
r 0.0041 α1 2.4794
(0.1384)
φ 0.0021 α2 0.8836
(0.2675)
b 0.0727
(0.2167)
Note: This table reports the point estimates for college-educated men.
In terms of the impact on the gender wage gap, the partial effect of the policy is rather
small and only reflects a slower rise up the fixed ladder of offers. The total effect, however,
which incorporates endogenous changes in the ladder itself, is almost three times stronger
and is most pronounced for more experienced women for the reasons just described above:
the gap increases by 0.007 log-points (or 7.2%) at the onset of workers’ careers and by 0.015
log-points (which corresponds to 5.2% as the gap increases) in years 11-15.
E.4 Quantifying the components of the gap
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Figure 10: Higher offers arrival rate in employment
(a) Average human capital (b) Average human capital price (c) The gender wage gap
Note: The figure shows the effect of a 7.9% decrease in the offers arrival rate, λe, to equalize it
to men’s level. Panel (a) shows the effect on human capital profile, Panel (b) shows the effect on
the average wage rate profile; in Panel(c), the baseline gap in log-wages between men and women
is depicted with a solid blue line, the dotted red line shows the partial effect of a change in the
parameter whereas the dashed green line shows the total effect that includes equilibrium responses of
the firms.
In Figure 11, we show the effect of the fertility-related parameters of men. We start by
decreasing the average length of the job-protected maternity leave of women by equalizing
γ2 and γ3 between men and women. This reduces the gap by 0.003 log-points (or 2.3%) in
the first 5 years of potential experience and by 0.013 log-points (or 4.6%) in years 11-15.
Then we also equalize the proportion of women who get an opportunity to go back to their
previous job to the rate of men. The combination of these two changes reduces the gap
by 0.014 log-points (9.13%) in years 1-5 and by 0.027 log-points (9.40%) in years 11-15.
Equalizing the fertility rate between men and women has virtually no additional impact
on the gap since the number of children that men and women have are very similar in the
data. Altogether, the differences in fertility-related parameters account for roughly 0.021
log-points 9.5% of the gender wage differential in the first 15 years of a career, and that
these parameters account for 0.018 log-points (10.21%) of the gap opening over the first 15
years of potential experience.30
In Figure 12, we analyze the effect of gender differences in the labor mobility parameters—
job finding and separation rates. We start with increasing women’s offers arrival rate in
unemployment λu to the men’s level (a 16.4% increase). This leads to a 0.03 log-points
(19.52%) reduction of the gap in the first 5 years of a career, and to a 0.032 log-point
30 The benchmark gap opens by 0.173 log points over the first 15 years in the market, and with fertility
parameters equalized it opens by 0.155 log points.
55
Figure 11: Implied wage gap giving women the fertility parameters of men
Note: The figure shows how the gap in log-wages by potential experience changes when we succes-
sively give women the fertility-related parameters of men.
(11.40%) reduction in years 11-15. Next, we equalize the arrival rates of women’s offers
in employment to the level of men (a decrease of 7.9% in λe). Since in this case women’s
parameter was “better” than men’s, this change offsets a bit the gains from the increase
in the job-finding rate λu so that the gap is now reduced by 0.02 log-points (12.91%) in
years 1-5 and by 0.018 log-points (6.33%) in years 11-15, relative to the benchmark. At the
last step, we equalize the separation rate of women to the level of men. This represents a
striking 36.8% decrease in the separation rate and has a massive impact on the life-cycle
gap dynamics. In particular, eliminating the differences in the transition rates would reduce
the gap by 0.139 log-points (64.30%) on average in the years 1-15 of potential experience.
Furthermore, these transition rates differences account for approximately 0.037 log-points
(21.51%) of the gap expansion over the same years.
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Figure 12: Implied wage gap giving women the transition rates of men
Note: The figure shows how the gap in log-wages by potential experience changes when we succes-
sively give women men’s transition-rate parameters outside of fertility episodes.
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